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OverviewImogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this topic tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist alternatives, and attempts to combine the most attractive elements of each. The account developed here is a new beginning. It starts with two basic principles. The first connects aboutness and truth: a belief is about the object upon whose properties its truth or falsity depends. The second connects truth and justification: justification is truth conducive; in general and allowing exceptions, a subject whose beliefs are justified will be unlucky if they are not true, and not merely lucky if they are. These principles--one connecting aboutness and truth; the other truth and justification--combine to yield a third principle connecting aboutness and justification: a body of beliefs is about the object upon which its associated means of justification converges; the object whose properties a subject justifying beliefs in this way will be unlucky to get wrong and not merely luck to get right. The first part of the book proves a precise version of this principle. Its remaining chapters use the principle to explain how the relations to objects that enable us to think about them--perceptual attention; understanding of proper names; grasp of descriptions--do their aboutness-fixing and thought-enabling work. The book includes discussions of the nature of singular thought and the relation between thought and consciousness. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Imogen Dickie (University of Toronto)Publisher: Oxford University Press Imprint: Oxford University Press Dimensions: Width: 15.70cm , Height: 1.90cm , Length: 23.30cm Weight: 0.522kg ISBN: 9780198801795ISBN 10: 0198801793 Pages: 344 Publication Date: 22 February 2018 Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , Tertiary & Higher Education , Professional & Vocational Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order ![]() Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of Contents1: Introduction 2: In which a precise version of the connection between aboutness and justification is derived from more basic principles 3: The mind has a basic need to represent things outside itself 4: Perceptual demonstratives 5: Proper names 6: The delicate question of reference by description 7: Descriptions and singular thought 8: Thought and consciousness Appendix: Key to notation References IndexReviewsIn this challenging and welcome contribution, Imogen Dickie presents an interesting account of a rich debate that has occupied, among others, philosophers of language and mind over the last few decades...Dickie's contribution should be viewed as a novel addition and enrichment. -- Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews In this challenging and welcome contribution, Imogen Dickie presents an interesting account of a rich debate that has occupied, among others, philosophers of language and mind over the last few decades...Dickie's contribution should be viewed as a novel addition and enrichment. -- Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews In this challenging and welcome contribution, Imogen Dickie presents an interesting account of a rich debate that has occupied, among others, philosophers of language and mind over the last few decades...Dickie's contribution should be viewed as a novel addition and enrichment. -- Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Author InformationImogen Dickie did her first degree in New Zealand and her graduate work at Oxford. She is currently a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |