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Overview"Some combinations of attitudes--of beliefs, credences, intentions, preferences, hopes, fears, and so on--do not fit together right: they are incoherent. A natural idea is that there are requirements of ""structural rationality"" that forbid us from being in these incoherent states. Yet a number of surprisingly difficult challenges arise for this idea. These challenges have recently led many philosophers to attempt to minimize or eliminate structural rationality, arguing that it is just a ""shadow"" of ""substantive rationality""--that is, correctly responding to one's reasons.In Fitting Things Together, Alex Worsnip pushes back against this trend--defending the view that structural rationality is a genuine kind of rationality, distinct from and irreducible to substantive rationality, and tackling the most important challenges for this view. In so doing, he gives an original positive theory of the nature of coherence and structural rationality that explains how the diverse range of instances of incoherence can be unified under a general account, and how facts about coherence are normatively significant. He also shows how a failure to focus on coherence requirements as a distinctive phenomenon and distinguish them adequately from requirements of substantive rationality has led to confusion and mistakes in several substantive debates in epistemology and ethics. Taken as a whole, Fitting Things Together provides the first sustained defense of the view that structural rationality is a genuine, autonomous, unified, and normatively significant phenomenon." Full Product DetailsAuthor: Alex Worsnip (Associate Professor of Philosophy, Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill)Publisher: Oxford University Press Inc Imprint: Oxford University Press Inc Dimensions: Width: 23.90cm , Height: 2.90cm , Length: 16.40cm Weight: 0.649kg ISBN: 9780197608142ISBN 10: 0197608140 Pages: 360 Publication Date: 24 March 2022 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order ![]() Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of ContentsPreface Part I: Dualism about Rationality Defended Chapter 1 Getting Structural (Ir)rationality into View Chapter 2 A Rough Account of Substantive Rationality Chapter 3 Eliminations and Reductions I Chapter 4 Eliminations and Reductions II Part II: A Theory of Structural Rationality Chapter 5 Unifying the Instances of Incoherence Chapter 6 Requirements of Structural Rationality Chapter 7 Talk about Structural Rationality Chapter 8 The Normativity of Structural Rationality Part III: Drawing Some Lessons Chapter 9 Upshots for Other Debates Coda The Tyranny of Value ReferencesReviewsAuthor InformationAlex Worsnip is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He works primarily in epistemology, ethics, and the theory of rationality. He is the author of over twenty articles in leading philosophy journals such as the Journal of Philosophy, Mind, Ethics, and Noûs. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |