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OverviewThe striking extent of religious disagreement suggests that religious conviction is very often the result of processes that do not reliably produce true beliefs. For this reason, many have argued that the only rational response to religious disagreement is to adopt a religious skepticism that eschews confident religious belief. Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment contests this skeptical conclusion, explaining how it could be rational to maintain confident belief even in the face of the epistemic worries posed by disagreement. John Pittard argues against the commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality that underlies the case for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism, while also critiquing approaches to disagreement that allow for the unproblematic privileging of one's first-person perspective. He emphasizes the importance of having rational insight into reasons that favor one's outlook; however, he challenges narrowly intellectualist accounts of insight, arguing that many of the rational insights crucial to assessing religious outlooks are not achievable through analytical reasoning, but only through relevant emotional experiences. In the second part of the book, Pittard considers the implications that accepting the impartiality requirement favored by ""disagreement skeptics"" has for religious commitment. He challenges the common assumption that a commitment to rigorous epistemic impartiality would rule out confident religious belief. He further argues, however, that such an impartiality commitment would likely make it irrational to pursue one's favored form of religious life and might prevent one from rationally engaging in any religious or irreligious way of life whatsoever. This troubling conclusion gives reason to hope that the arguments against impartiality are correct and that one can justify conviction despite widespread disagreement. Full Product DetailsAuthor: John Pittard (Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Religion, Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Religion, Yale Divinity School)Publisher: Oxford University Press Inc Imprint: Oxford University Press Inc Dimensions: Width: 23.90cm , Height: 1.00cm , Length: 15.50cm Weight: 1.021kg ISBN: 9780190051815ISBN 10: 0190051817 Pages: 360 Publication Date: 15 November 2019 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order ![]() Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of ContentsReviews"""To say that this is a book in religious epistemology is slightly misleading. For this book is, I think, required reading for any epistemologist working on disagreement. Likewise, given the sceptical threat to religious belief posed by conciliationism I also think that this book is required reading for the philosopher of religion. To genuinely engage two subdisciplines in philosophy in one unified project is an impressive feat in itself. My sense is that Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment is just the beginning for Pittard. I highly recommend it and I look forward to reading more of his work."" -- Kirk Lougheed, Faith and Philosophy ""John Pittard's book focuses on religious commitment, but his volume is also an impressive examination of the broader epistemological issues in play. It is the most thorough scholarly treatment yet of how to think about the epistemology of disagreement as it applies to the rationality of religious belief in an increasingly pluralistic world. Readers who are less interested in the epistemology of religion will nevertheless be rewarded by Pittard's carefully developed insights on disagreement and its lessons for mainstream epistemology."" -- Matthew A. Benton, Notre Dame Philosophical Review" John Pittard's book focuses on religious commitment, but his volume is also an impressive examination of the broader epistemological issues in play. It is the most thorough scholarly treatment yet of how to think about the epistemology of disagreement as it applies to the rationality of religious belief in an increasingly pluralistic world. Readers who are less interested in the epistemology of religion will nevertheless be rewarded by Pittard's carefully developed insights on disagreement and its lessons for mainstream epistemology. * Matthew A. Benton, Notre Dame Philosophical Review * Author InformationJohn Pittard is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy of Religion at Yale Divinity School, with a secondary appointment in the Yale Department of Philosophy. He received his Ph.D. from Yale, his M.Div. from Princeton Theological Seminary, and his A.B. from Harvard. He works in epistemology and the philosophy of religion. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |