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OverviewExamines policy design when the policy maker in imperfectly informed, focusing on cases where the regulated firm possesses better information about its technology than the regulator. Full Product DetailsAuthor: D. Besanko , D. SappingtonPublisher: Taylor & Francis Ltd Imprint: Routledge Weight: 0.234kg ISBN: 9780415274630ISBN 10: 041527463 Pages: 96 Publication Date: 06 December 2001 Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , Tertiary & Higher Education , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print ![]() This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of Contents1. Background: History and Related Literature 2. Adverse Selection 3. Auditing 4. Regulation and Moral Hazard 5. Multiperiod Models of Regulation and Information 6. Intertemporal Commitment 7. Interfirm Comparisons 8. Extensions and Future DirectionsReviewsAuthor InformationDavid Besanko, David E M Sappington Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |