Designing Democracy: Ideas for Better Rules
Author:   Hans A. Gersbach
Publisher:   Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
Edition:   2005 ed.
ISBN:  

9783540224020


Pages:   244
Publication Date:   07 September 2004
Format:   Hardback
Availability:   In Print   Availability explained
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Designing Democracy: Ideas for Better Rules


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Overview

This book presents a number of ideas for drawing up new rules to improve the functioning of democracies. The first part examines ways of combining incentive contracts with democratic elections. Such a judicious combination can alleviate a wide range of political failures without impairing the principles on which democracies are founded. The second part presents new rules for decision-making, agendas and agenda settings which can transcend the limitations of prevailing democracies in achieving desirable outcomes. An example is flexible majority rules where the size of the majority depends on the proposal. The book comprises a sequence of simple models and intuitive explanations of the results they yield.

Full Product Details

Author:   Hans A. Gersbach
Publisher:   Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
Imprint:   Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
Edition:   2005 ed.
Dimensions:   Width: 15.50cm , Height: 1.50cm , Length: 23.50cm
Weight:   1.200kg
ISBN:  

9783540224020


ISBN 10:   3540224025
Pages:   244
Publication Date:   07 September 2004
Audience:   Professional and scholarly ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Hardback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   In Print   Availability explained
This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us.

Table of Contents

Incentive Contracts and Elections.- Overview.- Unobservability and Short-Termism in Long-Term Policies.- Short-Termism and Competition for Incentive Contracts.- Reelection Thresholds.- Effort Incentives and Monetary Rewards.- Limits to Incentive Contracts in Politics.- Rules for Decision-Making and Agenda Setting.- Overiview.- Examples for Agenda Rules.- Flexible Majority Rules.- Democratic Mechanisms.- Fair Division.

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