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OverviewFull Product DetailsAuthor: Radha Poovendran , Walid SaadPublisher: Springer International Publishing AG Imprint: Springer International Publishing AG Edition: 2014 ed. Volume: 8840 Dimensions: Width: 15.50cm , Height: 2.10cm , Length: 23.50cm Weight: 5.971kg ISBN: 9783319126005ISBN 10: 3319126008 Pages: 381 Publication Date: 13 October 2014 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: Manufactured on demand ![]() We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier. Table of ContentsDefending Against Opportunistic Criminals: New Game-Theoretic Frameworks and Algorithms.- Addressing Scalability and Robustness in Security Games with Multiple Boundedly Rational Adversaries.- Empirical Game-Theoretic Analysis of an Adaptive Cyber-Defense Scenario.- Strategic Discovery and Sharing of Vulnerabilities in Competitive Environments.- Optimal Contracts for Outsourced Computation.- A Supervisory Control Approach to Dynamic Cyber-Security.- Numerical Computation of Multi-goal Security Strategies.- Realizable Rational Multiparty Cryptographic Protocols.- Limiting Adversarial Budget in Quantitative Security Assessment.- FlipThem: Modeling Targeted Attacks with FlipIt for Multiple Resources.- Secure Message Delivery Games for Device-to-Device Communications.- A Three-Stage Colonel Blotto Game: When to Provide More Information to an Adversary.- TowardOptimal Network Topology Design for Fast and Secure Distributed Computation.- An Economic Model and Simulation Results of App Adoption Decisions on Networks with Interdependent Privacy Consequences.- Cybersecurity Games and Investments: A Decision Support Approach.- Data Integrity and Availability Verification Game in Untrusted Cloud Storage.- Empirical Comparisons of Descriptive Multi-objective Adversary Models in Stackelberg Security Games.- A Dynamic Bayesian Security Game Framework for Strategic Defense Mechanism Design.- Can Less Be More? A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Filtering vs. Investment.- Online Learning Methods for Border Patrol Resource Allocation.- A Distributed Optimization Algorithm for Attack-Resilient Wide-Area Monitoring of Power Systems: Theoretical and Experimental Methods.- Testing for Hardware Trojans: A Game-Theoretic Approach.- Surveillance for Security as a Pursuit-Evasion Game.ReviewsAuthor InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |