Overview

Although Anaconda was successful in achieving its objective of clearing al Qaeda fighters out of the Shah-i-Kot Valley, the planning and execution errors associated with this operation have provided a wealth of valuable lessons for the United States military. This paper reviews the events of Anaconda and through a detailed analysis, examines the various criticisms it received. Critical shortfalls associated with CENTCOM's upper level command and control structure are revealed as the primary source of the confusion and problems surrounding the operation. Particular attention is paid to General Frank's controversial decision to lead such a large military effort from his Tampa headquarters; nine and a half time-zones away from the fight. It is concluded that despite errors resulting from this decision, it was in fact a viable strategy that offered many inherent benefits. By implementing the lessons learned from General Franks' long distance leadership, in conjunction with the latest academic recommendations on the subject, valuable guidelines are provided for combatant commanders choosing to lead this country's future conflicts from a headquarters geographically removed from the theater of operation.The decisions and events leading up to Operation Anaconda provide an ideal case study for many critical elements of modern day warfare. Although General Tommy Franks, the Combatant Commander in charge of Central Command (CENTCOM) during Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF), declared Anaconda an unqualified and absolute success, it has received significant criticism from both those within and outside military channels. The media for example, reacted negatively to the operation and focused their reporting on the loss of Americans lives, rather than the overall results of the conflict. On the military side there are many who claim senior leadership errors caused much of the confusion observed during the planning and execution phases. This paper reviews the events of Operation Anaconda and examines the various criticisms it received. Particular attention is paid to the use of long distance leadership, which is one of the more highly publicized criticisms of the Operation. It will be argued that leading a large military effort, such as Anaconda, from a headquarters geographically removed from the theater of operation is a viable strategy for the twenty-first century Combatant Commander; assuming the long distance leadership tenets presented in this paper are followed.Coordination problems between the air and land components became evident from the start of Anaconda and led to confusion throughout the theater. A prime example was that carrier strike group commanders, responsible for a majority of the strike-fighter missions, were not completely informed of the plan. As a result, the USS John C. Stennis aircraft carrier unknowingly canceled all flight operations during the first day of Operation Anaconda so the crew could enjoy a steel beach picnic. In the air information was equally confusing. A navy F/A-18C pilot who flew multiple missions during Operation Anaconda stated, There was a lot of chaos down there those first few days. . . . The initial plan that they had constructed for the grid system overhead the target area for organizing the flow of aircraft in and out was somewhat disorganized, and it was hard to work the target area and deconflict with other aircraft out there.

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