Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity

Author:   Joseph A. McCahery (, Tilburg University) ,  Piet Moerland (, Tilburg University) ,  Theo Raaijmakers (, Tilburg University) ,  Luc Renneboog (, Tilburg University)
Publisher:   Oxford University Press
ISBN:  

9780199247875


Pages:   718
Publication Date:   26 September 2002
Format:   Hardback
Availability:   To order   Availability explained
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Corporate Governance Regimes: Convergence and Diversity


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Overview

Corporate Governance Regimes addresses corporate law's leading question: whether one or another corporate law regime possesses relative competitive advantage. To this end, the editors have brought together an international team of scholars in economics and law to critically assess the new theories of ownership and control which seek to explain the important efficiency advantages of dispersed ownership and the inevitable limitations of control-oriented systems of governance. Contributors describe and analyse the relative strength of the forces that shape the evolution of corporate law rules and practice. They also raise the issue of whether nations undertaking reforms should develop corporate governance policies that borrow from other systems' best practices, or pursue a course of internally designed corporate governance reforms. And, building on new theories of law and finance, they examine the incentives for introducing meaningful corporate governance reforms that disrupt or destabilize Europe's blockholding regimes.The collection is divided into seven parts. Part One provides not only a means for assessing the key features of market- and control-based systems of governance but a standpoint for determining whether national governance systems are likely to converge on a single, optimal system of governance. Part Two introduces the reader to the building blocks of European corporate governance and the securities law harmonization program. Part Three examines the complex ownership and control structures that are found in Western Europe, investigating the consequences of large shareholdings for minority investors. Part Four offers law and finance analyses of the relationship between legal and financial systems and corporate performance. Part Five looks at the economic perspective on the operation of the market for corporate control and the key legal rules and institutions of the bankruptcy and insolvency regimes in the USA and Britain. Part Six is devoted to exploring the economic effect of institutional shareholder participation in corporate governance in the USA, Britain, and continental Europe. The final section, Part Seven, evaluates empirically the executive compensation arrangements in the USA, Britain, and continental Europe. The contributions supply a pool of current research on the motivational effect of performance-related remuneration and the substantial increase in top executive remuneration in the USA.

Full Product Details

Author:   Joseph A. McCahery (, Tilburg University) ,  Piet Moerland (, Tilburg University) ,  Theo Raaijmakers (, Tilburg University) ,  Luc Renneboog (, Tilburg University)
Publisher:   Oxford University Press
Imprint:   Oxford University Press
Dimensions:   Width: 16.40cm , Height: 4.40cm , Length: 24.20cm
Weight:   1.151kg
ISBN:  

9780199247875


ISBN 10:   0199247870
Pages:   718
Publication Date:   26 September 2002
Audience:   Professional and scholarly ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Hardback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   To order   Availability explained
Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us.

Table of Contents

1: J. McCahery and L. Renneboog: Introduction I. Legal Convergence of Corporate Governance Regimes2: W. Bratton and J. McCahery: The Case Against Global Cross Reference 3: H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman: Toward a Single Model of Corporate Law? 4: J. Coffee: Convergence and its Critics: What are the Preconditions to the Separation of Ownership and Control? 5: M. Roe: Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Control 6: B. Cheffins: Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the Berle-Means Corporation in the United Kingdom II. Harmonization and Diversity of Governance Principles in Europe7: K. Hopt: Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe? 8: T. Raaijmakers: The 13th Takeover Directive and the Williams Act 9: E. Wymeersch: Convergence or Divergence in Corporate Governance Patterns in Western Europe? III. Concentration of Ownership and Control in Europe10: M. Goergen and L. Renneboog: Prediction of Control Concentration in German and UK Initial Public Offerings 11: E. Boehmer: Who Controls German Corporations? 12: P. Moerland: Complete Separation of Ownership and Control: the Structure Regime and Other Defensive Mechanisms in the Netherlands 13: I.Dherment and L. Renneboog: Share Price Reactions to CEO Resignations and Large Shareholder Monitoring in Listed French Companies IV. Economic Performance and Governance Structures14: W. Carlin and C. Mayer: How Do Financial Systems Affect Economic Performance? 15: D. Lombardo and M. Pagano: Law and Equity Markets: A Simple Model 16: E. Perrotti and E. L. von Thadden: Investor Dominance and Strategic Transparency: on the Role of Corporate Governance for Product and Capital Market Competition 17: M. Maher and T. Andersson: Corporate Governance: Effects on Firm Performance and Economic Growth V. The Value of Corporate Control and Reorganization of the Firm18: C. Robinson, J. Rumsey, and A. White: The Value of a Vote in the Market for Corporate Control: Canadian Evidence 19: J. Franks, C. Mayer, and L. Renneboog: Managerial Disciplining and the Market for (Partial) Corporate Control in the UK 20: J. Franks and W. Torous: A Comparison of English and American Bankruptcy Procedures 21: U. Hege and P. Mella-Barral: Reorganization Law and Dilution Threats in Different Financial Systems 22: L. Bebchuk: Using Options to Divide Value in Corporate Bankruptcy VI. The Role of Institutional Shareholders in Corporate Governance23: R. Romano: Less is More; Making Shareholder Activism a Valued Mechanism of Corporate Governance 24: G. Stapledon and J. Bates: Unpacking the 'Interest-holders' in a Share: Making Voting Easier for Institutional Shareholders 25: M. Faccio and M. Lasfer: Institutional Shareholders and Corporate Governance: the Case of UK Pension Funds VII. Executive Compensation26: M. Conyon and K. Murphy: Stock-Based Executive Compensation 27: R. Crespi, C. Gispert, and L. Renneboog: Cash-Based Executive Compensation in Spain and the UK 28: P. Duffhues, R. Kabir, G. Mertens, and P. Roosenboom: Employee Stock Option Grants and Firm Performance in the Netherlands

Reviews

With globalization and greater financial integration, corporate governance reform has become an important policy priority. Some of the greatest authorities in corporate governance are gathered here to discuss the policy issues of the day ... this volume is fascinating reading and highly informative. I recommend it to anyone interested in these important policy issues. Patrick Bolton, Princeton University The field of comparative corporate governance has made great strides in the last several years. This book represents a fascinating collection of state-of-the-art articles beautifully illustrating the great progress of the field. Andrei Shleifer, Harvard University Corporate Governance Regimes provides an illuminating acute analysis of the central problems of comparative corporate governance and makes a vital contribution to the key policy debates on the direction of corporate governance reform. Lawrence E. Mitchell, George Washington University Law School This comprehensive volume studies the development and consequences of corporate governance mechanisms in modern economies. It will be of great value to economists, lawyers, policy makers, and all who are concerned with economic development and the distribution of power within modern societies. Michael Brennan, University of California at Los Angeles, UCLA


Author Information

Joseph A. McCahery is Professor of International Business Law at Tilburg University Faculty of Law and the Center for Company Law. He holds a visiting appointment at Leiden University Faculty of Law. Piet Moerland is Professor of Corporate Governance at Tilburg University where he teaches courses on mergers and acquisitions and corporate governance. M.J.G.C. (Theo) Raaijmakers is Professor of Corporate Law at Tilburg University Faculty of Law. Luc Renneboog is Associate Professor at the Department of Finance of Tilburg University and research fellow at the Center for Economic Research (Tilburg).

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