Overview
The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we apply. It requires that no coalition of players in no subgame can weakly Pareto improve the vector of continuation average discounted payoffs of its members by a deviation. If the sum of firms' average discounted profits is maximized along the equilibrium path then the equilibrium output of each type of good is produced with the lowest possible costs. If, in addition, all buyers are retailers (i.e., they resell the goods purchased in the analyzed market in a retail market) then the equilibrium vector of the quantities sold in the retail market is sold with the lowest possible selling costs. We specify sufficient conditions under which collusion increases consumer welfare.
Full Product Details
Author: Milan Horniaček
Publisher: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
Imprint: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
Edition: 2011 ed.
Volume: 649
Dimensions:
Width: 15.50cm
, Height: 0.50cm
, Length: 23.50cm
Weight: 0.454kg
ISBN: 9783642197628
ISBN 10: 3642197620
Pages: 92
Publication Date: 27 May 2011
Audience:
Professional and scholarly
,
Professional & Vocational
Format: Paperback
Publisher's Status: Active
Availability: Awaiting stock
The supplier is currently out of stock of this item. It will be ordered for you and placed on backorder. Once it does come back in stock, we will ship it out for you.
Reviews
From the reviews: The book under review studies the theory of repeated games in oligopoly theory and analyzes countably infinite repetition (or supergame) of interactions between firms on both sides of a market with dicounting of future profits. ... The results of the book may be useful in adjusting antitrust policy and competition policy in the world. (Weiping Li, Zentralblatt MATH, Vol. 1223, 2011)
From the reviews: “The book under review studies the theory of repeated games in oligopoly theory and analyzes countably infinite repetition (or supergame) of interactions between firms on both sides of a market with dicounting of future profits. … The results of the book may be useful in adjusting antitrust policy and competition policy in the world.” (Weiping Li, Zentralblatt MATH, Vol. 1223, 2011)
From the reviews: The book under review studies the theory of repeated games in oligopoly theory and analyzes countably infinite repetition (or supergame) of interactions between firms on both sides of a market with dicounting of future profits. ... The results of the book may be useful in adjusting antitrust policy and competition policy in the world. (Weiping Li, Zentralblatt MATH, Vol. 1223, 2011)
From the reviews: The book under review studies the theory of repeated games in oligopoly theory and analyzes countably infinite repetition (or supergame) of interactions between firms on both sides of a market with dicounting of future profits. ... The results of the book may be useful in adjusting antitrust policy and competition policy in the world. (Weiping Li, Zentralblatt MATH, Vol. 1223, 2011)
Author Information
Milan Horniaček is currently an Associate Professor of Economics at the Institute of Public Policy and Economics of the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences of the Comenius University in Bratislava. His research interests include non-cooperative game theory, industrial organization, antitrust policy and microeconomic theory. The analysis of equilibria in infinite horizon non-cooperative games that are immune to deviations by coalitions is the most important part of his research.
