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OverviewColin McGinn presents his latest work on consciousness in ten interlinked essays, four of them previously unpublished. He extends and deepens his controversial solution to the mind-body problem, defending the view that consciousness is both ontologically unproblematic and epistemologically impenetrable. He also investigates the basis of our knowledge that there is a mind-body problem, and the bearing of this on attempted solutions. McGinn goes on to discuss the status of first-person authority, the possibility of atomism with respect to consciousness, extreme dualism, and the role of non-existent objects in constituting intentionality. He argues that traditional claims about our knowledge of our own mind and of the external world can be inverted; that atomism about the conscious mind might turn out to be true; that dualism is more credible the more extreme it is; and that all intentionality involves non-existent objects. These are all surprising positions, but he contends that what the philosophy of mind needs now is 'methodological radicalism' - a willingness to consider new and seemingly extravagant ideas. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Colin McGinn (, Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Jersey)Publisher: Oxford University Press Imprint: Oxford University Press Dimensions: Width: 14.00cm , Height: 1.90cm , Length: 21.10cm Weight: 0.413kg ISBN: 9780199267606ISBN 10: 019926760 Pages: 264 Publication Date: 25 March 2004 Audience: College/higher education , Tertiary & Higher Education Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order ![]() Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of ContentsReviewsAuthor InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |