Full Product Details
Author: John H. Kagel ,
Dan Levin
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Imprint: Princeton University Press
Dimensions:
Width: 15.20cm
, Height: 2.60cm
, Length: 23.50cm
Weight: 0.794kg
ISBN: 9780691016672
ISBN 10: 0691016674
Pages: 424
Publication Date: 11 August 2002
Audience:
Professional and scholarly
,
College/higher education
,
Professional & Vocational
,
Tertiary & Higher Education
Format: Hardback
Publisher's Status: Active
Availability: Manufactured on demand
We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier.
Language: English
Reviews
I know of no book that offers such a comprehensive treatment of theory and experiments in common value auctions. The papers it brings together represent very significant contributions to both auction theory and auction behavior and are of the highest quality. -Douglas Davis, Virginia Commonwealth University This book shows that the kind of winner's curse at issue is pervasive across various types of auctions and is not eliminated by experience or even by using expert bidders. One of its main contributions is the specification of naive bidding models that explain patterns of deviations from (Nash) theoretical predictions. The ex post perspectives about how to improve experimental designs and procedures for dealing with bankruptcies were particularly interesting. -Charles A. Holt, University of Virginia
I know of no book that offers such a comprehensive treatment of theory and experiments in common value auctions. The papers it brings together represent very significant contributions to both auction theory and auction behavior and are of the highest quality. --Douglas Davis, Virginia Commonwealth University This book shows that the kind of winner's curse at issue is pervasive across various types of auctions and is not eliminated by experience or even by using expert bidders. One of its main contributions is the specification of na�ve bidding models that explain patterns of deviations from (Nash) theoretical predictions. The ex post perspectives about how to improve experimental designs and procedures for dealing with bankruptcies were particularly interesting. --Charles A. Holt, University of Virginia
""This book shows that the kind of winner's curse at issue is pervasive across various types of auctions and is not eliminated by experience or even by using expert bidders. One of its main contributions is the specification of naïve bidding models that explain patterns of deviations from (Nash) theoretical predictions. The ex post perspectives about how to improve experimental designs and procedures for dealing with bankruptcies were particularly interesting.""—Charles A. Holt, University of Virginia ""I know of no book that offers such a comprehensive treatment of theory and experiments in common value auctions. The papers it brings together represent very significant contributions to both auction theory and auction behavior and are of the highest quality.""—Douglas Davis, Virginia Commonwealth University
Author Information
John H. Kagel is University Chaired Professor of Applied Economics and director of the Economics Laboratory at Ohio State University. A leading economic theorist, he is coeditor of, and a contributor to, The Handbook of Experimental Economics (Princeton). Dan Levin is professor of economics at Ohio State University. He has published numerous articles on competitive bidding and industrial organization in leading economic journals.
