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Author:   Paul Weirich (Curators' Professor, Department of Philosophy, Curators' Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri-Columbia)
Publisher:   Oxford University Press Inc
Imprint:   Oxford University Press Inc
Dimensions:   Width: 23.40cm , Height: 1.50cm , Length: 15.60cm
Weight:   0.399kg
ISBN:  

9780199929016

ISBN 10:   0199929017
Pages:   284
Publication Date:   12 July 2012
Audience:   College/higher education ,  Professional and scholarly ,  Tertiary & Higher Education ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Paperback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   To order  
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Table of Contents

1. Rationality Writ Large 1.1. Collective Acts 1.2. Method 1.3. Guide 2. Agents and Acts 2.1. Agents 2.2. Acts 2.3. Control 2.4. Evaluability 3. Rationality 3.1. Metatheory 3.2. Attainability 3.3. Comprehensiveness 3.4. Compositionality 4. Groups 4.1. Extension 4.2. Efficiency 4.3. Collective Utility 4.4. Compositionality 5. Games of Strategy 5.1. Games 5.2. Solutions 5.3. Standards 6. Equilibrium 6.1. Standards and Procedures 6.2. Utility Maximization 6.3. Self-Support 6.4. Strategic Equilibrium 6.5. Realization of an Equilibrium 6.6. Appendix: Realization of a Nash Equilibrium 7. Coordination 7.1. Strategy and Learning 7.2. Changing the Rules 7.3. An Efficient Equilibrium 7.4. Preparation 7.5. Intentions 8. Cooperative Games 8.1. Joint Action 8.2. Opportunities for Joint Action 8.3. Coalitional Games 8.4. The Core 8.5. An Empty Core 9. Strategy for Coalitions 9.1. A Coalition's Incentives 9.2. Paths of Incentives 9.3. Strategic Equilibrium in Coalitional Games 10. Illustrations and Comparisons 10.1. The Majority-Rule Game 10.2. Comparisons 10.3. Conflict 10.4. Collective Standards 11. Compositionality 11.1. Underlying Games 11.2. Confirmation 11.3. Agreement Games 11.4. The Core and Utility Maximization 11.5. Strategic Equilibrium and Self-Support 12. Implications 12.1. Social Institutions 12.2. Strategic Equilibrium and Institutions 12.3. Theoretical Unity 12.4. Future Research Notes References Index

Reviews

Paul Weirich argues in this book convincingly for a new way of seeing collective rationality based on the simple and intuitive notion of compositionality: a group's act is rational if the members of the group act rationally. This book will suit anyone interested in normative decision theory, game theory or collective action. It is a thorough analysis of the normative basis for collective decision making in ideal cases. -- Niklas Vareman, Analysis My overall conclusion is the Weirich's theory of collective rationality is a very precise, internally coherent, and highly impressive contribution to the literature. It deserves to be carefully studied in the years to come. --Martin Peterson, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Paul Weirich argues in this book convincingly for a new way of seeing collective rationality based on the simple and intuitive notion of compositionality: a group's act is rational if the members of the group act rationally. This book will suit anyone interested in normative decision theory, game theory or collective action. It is a thorough analysis of the normative basis for collective decision making in ideal cases. -- Niklas Vareman, Analysis My overall conclusion is the Weirich's theory of collective rationality is a very precise, internally coherent, and highly impressive contribution to the literature. It deserves to be carefully studied in the years to come. --Martin Peterson, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

Paul Weirich argues in this book convincingly for a new way of seeing collective rationality based on the simple and intuitive notion of compositionality: a group's act is rational if the members of the group act rationally. This book will suit anyone interested in normative decision theory, game theory or collective action. It is a thorough analysis of the normative basis for collective decision making in ideal cases. Niklas Vareman, Analysis My overall conclusion is the Weirich's theory of collective rationality is a very precise, internally coherent, and highly impressive contribution to the literature. It deserves to be carefully studied in the years to come. Martin Peterson, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews

<br> Paul Weirich argues in this book convincingly for a new way of seeing collective rationality based on the simple and intuitive notion of compositionality: a group's act is rational if the members of the group act rationally. This book will suit anyone interested in normative decision theory, game theory or collective action. It is a thorough analysis of the normative basis for collective decision making in ideal cases. -- Niklas Vareman, Analysis<p><br> My overall conclusion is the Weirich's theory of collective rationality is a very precise, internally coherent, and highly impressive contribution to the literature. It deserves to be carefully studied in the years to come. --Martin Peterson, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews<p><br>

Author Information

Paul Weirich is Curators' Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of Missouri-Columbia

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