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Author:   Robert D. Rupert (Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Colorado)
Publisher:   Oxford University Press Inc
Imprint:   Oxford University Press Inc
Dimensions:   Width: 23.60cm , Height: 2.80cm , Length: 16.00cm
Weight:   0.547kg
ISBN:  

9780195379457

ISBN 10:   0195379454
Pages:   288
Publication Date:   10 September 2009
Audience:   College/higher education ,  Professional and scholarly ,  Tertiary & Higher Education ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Hardback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   To order  
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Table of Contents

Preface 1: Introduction: The Mind, the Computer, and the Alternatives 1.1: The Mind as Computer 1.2: The Alternatives: The Varieties of Situated Cognition 1.3: Looking Ahead 1.4: Strategy and Methods 1.4.1: Slaying the Cartesian Beast? 1.4.2: The Scope of Situated Views 1.4.3: Philosophy of Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind 1.5: The Book's Conclusions Part I: The Thinking Organism 2: Principles of Demarcation 2.1: The Challenge of Demarcation 2.2: Extension-Friendly Principles of Demarcation 2.2.1: The Causal Principle 2.2.2: Epistemic Dependence 2.2.3: Metaphysical Necessity and Sufficiency 2.2.4: Clark and Chalmers's Four Criteria 2.3: The Parity Principle 2.4: Conclusion 3: Cognitive Systems and Demarcation 3.1: The Success of Cognitive Psychology 3.2: The Systems-based View 3.2.1: In Outline 3.2.2: A Technical Elaboration 3.2.3: The Virtues of the Systems-based View 3.3: Two Arguments against the Extended View 3.4: Extension-Friendly Rejoinders 3.4.1: Organism-Centered Cognition 3.4.2: Abstract Properties and Extended Systems 3.4.3: Growing and Shrinking Systems 3.5: The No-Self View 3.5.1: Cognitive Systems without Robust Selves 3.5.2: The No-Self View and Arguments against the Extended Approach 3.5.3: Rejoinder and Response 4: Realization and Extended Cognition 4.1: The Argument from Empirical Success and Methodology, Restated 4.2: Extended Cognition and Realization 4.3: Functionalism and the Causal Constraint on Realization 4.4: The Argument from Causal Interaction 4.4.1: Basic Statement of the Argument 4.4.2: Premise One 4.4.3: Premise Two 4.4.4: Premise Four and Beyond 4.4.5: A Rejoinder and a Rebuttal 4.5: Wide Realization, Total Realization, and Causal Powers 4.5.1: Wilson on Realization 4.5.2: Semantic Externalism and Total Realization 4.5.3: The Role of Relational Properties in Cognitive Science 4.6: Cleaning Up 4.6.1: Socially Embedded Properties and Wide Core Realization 4.6.2: The Single-Neuron Argument 4.6.3: Additional Support Part II: Arguments for the Extended View 5: Functionalism and Natural Kinds 5.1: The Functionalist Argument 5.2: The Natural-Kinds Argument 5.3: The Empirical Response 5.3.1: Short-Term External Memory? 5.3.2: Cognitive Impartiality 5.4: The Pragmatic Turn 6: Developmental Systems Theory and the Scaffolding of Language 6.1: Causal Spread and Complementary Role 6.1.1: Nontrivial Causal Spread 6.1.2: Environment as Complement 6.2: A Case of Nontrivial Causal Spread: Developmental Systems Theory 6.3: The Most Powerful Transformation: Language-Learning 6.3.1: Linguistic Content and Thought Content 6.3.2: Structural Effects 7: Dynamical Systems Theory 7.1: Dynamical Systems Theory and Cognitive Science 7.2: Dynamical Systems and Extended Cognition: General Patterns of Argument 7.3: Six Kinds of Dynamical-Systems-Based Model 7.3.1: Model-Type One: Historical Grounding 7.3.2: Model-Type Two: Organismically Internal Dynamical Interactions 7.3.3: Model-Type Three: Active External Control 7.3.4: Model-Type Four: Organismic Collective Variables, Extended Realizers 7.3.5: Model-Type Five: Extended Collective Variable, Organismic Separability 7.3.6: Model-Type Six: Extended Order Parameter, No Local Separability 7.4: Evolution, Context-Dependence, and Epistemic Dependence 8: The Experience of Extension and the Extension of Experience 8.1: Cognitive Science and the In-Key Constraint 8.2: The Phenomenology of Smooth Coping 8.2.1: The Argument from Smooth Coping 8.2.2: The Heideggerian Framework 8.2.3: Wheeler's Appeal to Dynamical Systems Theory 8.3: The Sense of One's Own Location 8.4: Control-based Arguments 8.5: Control Simpliciter 8.6: Extended Cognition and Extended Experience Part III: The Embedded and Embodied Mind 9: Embedded Cognition and Computation 9.1: The Embedded Approach 9.2: Computation, Implementation, and Explicitly Encoded Rules 9.3: Computationalism in Principle and Computationalism in Practice 9.4: Timing, Computationalism, and Dynamical Systems Theory 9.5: Conclusion 10: Embedded Cognition and Mental Representation 10.1: What Is Special about Embedded Representation? 10.1.1: Detailed or Partial? 10.1.2: Context-Dependent and Action-Oriented Representations 10.1.3: Relational and Egocentric Representations 10.2: Atomic Affordance Representations 10.3: Embedded Models and External Content 10.4: Innate Representations and the Inflexibility Objection 10.5: Conclusion 11: The Embodied View 11.1: Preliminaries: Where the Disagreement Is Not 11.1.1: Materialism 11.1.2: Functionalism 11.1.3: Arbitrary Symbols and Embodiment 11.1.4: Abstract Symbols 11.2: The Constraint Thesis 11.3: The Content Thesis 11.3.1: External Content 11.3.2: Content-Determination by Causal Mediation 11.3.3: Narrow Content 11.4: Vehicles, Realizers, and Apportioning Explanation 11.5: The Symbol-Grounding Problem 11.5.1: Symbol-Grounding and Reference 11.5.2: Symbol-Grounding and Narrow Content 12: Summary and Conclusion Works Cited Index

Reviews

There's much to be admired in this book, and not much left to be desired. Without sacrificing philosophical rigor or attention to empirical details, Rupert repeatedly brings empirical findings under philosophical scrutiny. From start to finish, he spots enthymematic arguments, and over and over again, he challenges both opponents of the embedded view and those who hold that the rules and representations approach to cognition is outdated and needs to be supplanted. Cogntive Systems demands the attention of everyone who is interested in the nature of cognition. I highly recommend this book. --Minds and Machines Rupert's work is impressive both in its scope and its depth. I'll give it the highest praise that I can think to give a book in philosophy: before I read it, I was on the fence about HEC. The book convinced me. It is excellent work, and one that should be read by anyone in the debate. --Journal ofMind and Behavior

<br> There's much to be admired in this book, and not much left to be desired. Without sacrificing philosophical rigor or attention to empirical details, Rupert repeatedly brings empirical findings under philosophical scrutiny. From start to finish, he spots enthymematic arguments, and over and over again, he challenges both opponents of the embedded view and those who hold that the rules and representations approach to cognition is outdated and needs to be supplanted. Cogntive Systems demands the attention of everyone who is interested in the nature of cognition. I highly recommend this book. --Minds and Machines<p><br> Rupert's work is impressive both in its scope and its depth. I'll give it the highest praise that I can think to give a book in philosophy: before I read it, I was on the fence about HEC. The book convinced me. It is excellent work, and one that should be read by anyone in the debate. --Journal ofMind and Behavior<p><br>

Author Information

Robert D. Rupert is Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Colorado, Boulder

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