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Overview""Chapters in Game Theory"" was written to mark the occasion of the 65th birthday of Stef Tijs, who is regarded by many as the ""godfather"" of game theory in the Netherlands. The contributors all are indebted to Stef Tijs, as former PhD students or otherwise. The text contains 14 chapters on a wide range of subjects. Some of these can be considered surveys while other chapters present new results: most contributions can be positioned somewhere in between these categories. The topics covered include: co-operative stochastic games; nonco-operative stochastic games; sequencing games; games arising from linear (semi-) infinite programming problems; network formation, costs and potential games; potentials and consistency in transferable utility games; the nucleolus and equilibrium prices; population uncertainty and equilibrium selection; cost sharing; centrality in social networks; extreme points of the core; equilibrium sets of bimatrix games; game theory and the market; and transfer procedures for nontransferable utility games. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Peter Borm , H.J. PetersPublisher: Springer-Verlag New York Inc. Imprint: Springer-Verlag New York Inc. Edition: 2002 ed. Volume: 31 Dimensions: Width: 15.50cm , Height: 2.00cm , Length: 23.50cm Weight: 1.440kg ISBN: 9781402070631ISBN 10: 1402070632 Pages: 316 Publication Date: 31 May 2002 Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , Undergraduate , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print ![]() This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of ContentsStochastic Cooperative Games: Theory and Applications.- Sequencing Games: a Survey.- Game Theory and the Market.- On the Number of Extreme Points of the Core of a Transferable Utility Game.- Consistency and Potentials in Cooperative TU-Games: Sobolev’s Reduced Game Revived.- On the Set of Equilibria of a Bimatrix Game: a Survey.- Concave and Convex Serial Cost Sharing.- Centrality Orderings in Social Networks.- The Shapley Transfer Procedure for NTU-Games.- The Nucleolus as Equilibrium Price.- Network Formation, Costs, and Potential Games.- Contributions to the Theory of Stochastic Games.- Linear (Semi-) Infinite Programs and Cooperative Games.- Population Uncertainty and Equilibrium Selection: a Maximum Likelihood Approach.ReviewsAuthor InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |