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OverviewCase Studies in Contracting and Organization is an edited collection of empirical studies from the transaction-cost economics literature on contracting and organization. Derived from the work of Ronald Coase, 1991 winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, Olive Williamson, and other transaction-cost economists, the studies explore such fundamental organizational issues as the role of reputation, the purpose and limitations of contracts, the nature and boundaries of the firm, and the evolution and role of hybrid organizational forms such as franchising, leasing, and joint ventures. Industries covered include aerospace, automotive, electric power generation, fast food, natural gas, ocean shipping, petroleum, coke refining, rail transportation, soft drink distribution, shoe manufacturing, and tuna processing. An introductory chapter provides an overview of transaction-cost reasoning and a summary of each study's contributions to our understanding of the problem of economic organization. The relatively nontechnical nature of the readings makes the book accessible to business and law students as well as advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics. Full Product DetailsAuthor: MastenPublisher: Oxford University Press Inc Imprint: Oxford University Press Inc Dimensions: Width: 15.60cm , Height: 2.30cm , Length: 23.50cm Weight: 0.490kg ISBN: 9780195092523ISBN 10: 019509252 Pages: 360 Publication Date: 25 January 1996 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of Contents1: Introduction Part I. Contracting 2: Robert C. Ellickson: A Hypothesis of Wealth-Maximizing Norms: Evidence from the Whaling Industry 3: Thomas M. Palay: Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight Contracting 4: Victor P. Goldberg and John P. Erickson: Quantity and Price Adjustment in Long-Term Contracts: A Case Study of Petroleum Coke 5: Scott E. Masten and Keith J. Crocker: Efficient Adaptation in Long-Term Contracts: Take-or-Pay Provisions for Natural Gas 6: Paui L. Joskow: Contract Duration and Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence from Coal Markets 7: Stephen Craig Pirrong: Contracting Practices in Bulk Shipping Markets: A Transaction Cost Explanation Part II. Vertical Integration 8: Benjamin Klein: Vertical Integration as Organizational Ownership: The Fisher Body-General Motors Relationship Revisited 9: Kirk Monteverde and David J. Teece: Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry 10: Scott E. Masten: The Organization of Production: Evidence from the Aerospace Industry Part III. Hybrids 11: Edward C. Gallick: Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration: The Efficiency of Contracts in the Tuna Industry 12: Scott E. Masten and Edward A. Snyder: United States vs. United Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits 13: Timothy J. Muris, David T. Scheffman, and Pablo T. Spiller: Strategy and Transaction Costs: The Organization of Distribution in the Carbonated Soft Drink Indstry 14: Patrick J. Kaufman and Francine Lafontaine: Costs of Control: The Source of Economic Rents for McDonalds FranchisesReviewsShould be recommended to students on any Business/Industrial Economics course. Maria Moschandreas, Middlesex University Author InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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