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9781498597791

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Citizens and politicians of all stripes generally agree that controlling the bureaucracy is difficult, elusive, and frustrating. In this new book, Eleanor Schiff (Bucknell Univ.) explores the question of who controls the bureaucracy through a quantitative analysis of 139 agencies and a case study of US education policy at the federal level. The author's extensive Washington experience informs her understanding of the issue and the book's central theme: political control of the bureaucracy is contingent on characteristics of the bureaucratic agency itself (p. 6). She makes the case for an agent-principal approach to replace the simpler principal-agent approach traditionally employed in evaluating political control of bureaucratic agencies. . . Schiff's research supports some surprising findings: for example, Republican administrations move education policy in a slightly more liberal direction, and Democratic administrations have the opposite effect. She also finds that education policy is not responsive to public opinion, at least in the short term. Overall, Schiff concludes that the president and Congress do influence bureaucratic agencies, but agency structure and staff composition condition the extent and nature of that control. Summing Up: Recommended. All readership levels. * Choice * Through both large-n and case study analysis, Bureaucracy's Masters and Minions clearly demonstrates that political principals' capacity to control bureaucratic agents is highly conditioned by the structures and tasks of agencies. It thus stands as a vital and timely corrective of agency theory. -- David Lowery, Penn State University Eleanor Schiff's Bureaucracy's Masters and Minions provides valuable insight into how federal agencies operate within our separation of powers system. By examining the relationship between elected officials and the bureaucracy from the perspective of federal administrators, Schiff provides readers with a more nuanced understanding of administrative responsiveness to their political principals. She engages with and builds upon foundational literature on political control of the bureaucracy to illustrate that variation in agency working environments provides an important and underappreciated role explanation of administrative decision-making. Considered as a whole, this book provides scholars in political science, public administration, and public policy with accessible explanations of administrative politics and will inspire new directions for future research. -- Jennifer L. Selin, Kinder Institute on Constitutional Democracy, University of Missouri

Citizens and politicians of all stripes generally agree that controlling “the bureaucracy” is difficult, elusive, and frustrating. In this new book, Eleanor Schiff (Bucknell Univ.) explores the question of “who controls the bureaucracy” through a quantitative analysis of 139 agencies and a case study of US education policy at the federal level. The author’s extensive Washington experience informs her understanding of the issue and the book’s central theme: “political control of the bureaucracy is contingent on characteristics of the bureaucratic agency itself” (p. 6). She makes the case for an “agent-principal” approach to replace the simpler “principal-agent” approach traditionally employed in evaluating political control of bureaucratic agencies. . . Schiff's research supports some surprising findings: for example, Republican administrations move education policy in a slightly more liberal direction, and Democratic administrations have the opposite effect. She also finds that education policy is not responsive to public opinion, at least in the short term. Overall, Schiff concludes that the president and Congress do influence bureaucratic agencies, but agency structure and staff composition condition the extent and nature of that control. Summing Up: Recommended. All readership levels. * Choice * “Through both large-n and case study analysis, Bureaucracy’s Masters and Minions clearly demonstrates that political principals’ capacity to control bureaucratic agents is highly conditioned by the structures and tasks of agencies. It thus stands as a vital and timely corrective of agency theory.” -- David Lowery, Penn State University “Eleanor Schiff’s Bureaucracy’s Masters and Minions provides valuable insight into how federal agencies operate within our separation of powers system. By examining the relationship between elected officials and the bureaucracy from the perspective of federal administrators, Schiff provides readers with a more nuanced understanding of administrative responsiveness to their political principals. She engages with and builds upon foundational literature on political control of the bureaucracy to illustrate that variation in agency working environments provides an important and underappreciated role explanation of administrative decision-making. Considered as a whole, this book provides scholars in political science, public administration, and public policy with accessible explanations of administrative politics and will inspire new directions for future research.” -- Jennifer L. Selin, Kinder Institute on Constitutional Democracy, University of Missouri

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Eleanor L. Schiff is visiting assistant professor of political science at Bucknell University.

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