Overview

Confronted with the continuing cost expansion in the health care sector, policy makers face a dilemma: limiting moral hazard in medical care requires that consumers participate in the cost, yet copayment is strongly resisted by today's socially insured. Thus, the experiences of three private German health insurers will be of interest to physicians, social scientists, and policy makers. Insurer A writes conventional plans with deductibles and coinsurance; B pays back three-monthly premiums as a fixed rebate for no claims; while C runs an experience-rated bonus system starting with a rebate of three-monthly premiums for the first year without a claim, reaching a maximum of five after three years. While both rebates and bonuses are quite popular among insureds, this study shows that bonus options are particularly effective in limiting the demand for ambulatory and even hospital care. But what about adverse effects on health caused by the desire to save one's bonus? On this issue, there is some surprising evidence.

Full Product Details

Author:   Otto Waser ,  Peter Zweifel
Publisher:   Springer
Imprint:   Springer
Edition:   Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 1992
Volume:   2
Dimensions:   Width: 15.50cm , Height: 0.80cm , Length: 23.50cm
Weight:   0.454kg
ISBN:  

9789401051170

ISBN 10:   9401051178
Pages:   143
Publication Date:   25 September 2012
Audience:   Professional and scholarly ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Paperback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   Manufactured on demand  
We will order this item for you from a manufactured on demand supplier.

Table of Contents

1. Overview and key statements of the study.- 2. Institutional framework, issues, and results.- 3. Health insurance options from the point of view of the consumer.- 4. Insurer A: Traditional cost sharing.- 5. Insurer B: Fixed rebates for no claims.- 6. Self-selection of risks with insurers A and B?.- 7. Insurer C: The dynamic bonus system.- 8. First-dollar coverage, fixed rebate, and dynamic bonus compared.- 9. Bonus options in social health insurance?.- Appendix A. Tables.- A. 1. Characterization of data base.- A.2. Dependent variables and means (1982), insurer A.- A.3. Explanatory variables and means (1982), insurer A.- A.4. Dependent variables and means (1982), insurer B.- A.5. Explanatory variables and means (1982), insurer B.- A.6. Dependent variables, merged sample.- A.7. Explanatory variables and means, subsamples and merged sample.- Appendix B. Sample construction and choice of statistical method.- B.1. Overview of plans written by insurers A, B, and C.- B.2. Representativeness and comparability of samples.- B.3. Methodological issues in empirical analysis.- B.3.1. Neutralizing the decision to submit.- B.3.2. Choice of statistical method.- B.3.3. Description of explanatory variables.- References.- Index of names.- Index of subjects.

Reviews

'It is an economic study as it should be: clear questions are raised, hypotheses are derived from theoretical models, and the hypotheses are tested with empirical data.' Health Economics 2:1 1993

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