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9781138208940

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""If McCormick’s case for her two main theses strikes you as highly plausible, you are not alone: this book very effectively criticizes much of contemporary orthodoxy...Anyone henceforth interested in questions about agency, and its relation to normativity, will need to engage with McCormick’s important book."" -- Ram Neta, forthcoming in Mind ""McCormick does an outstanding job drawing our attention to questions about the ultimate basis for epistemic normativity and the extent of our control over belief."" -- Peter J. Graham, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews ""McCormick defends the claims that some beliefs are 'permissible' in the absence of evidence because 'doxastic norms are not wholly evidential.' Further, she suggests that, contrary to 'evidentialism,' criteria for acceptable beliefs must include reference to one's emotions, desires, and well-being - concerns that sometimes override the need for evidence."" -- CHOICE Reviews, S.A. Mason, Concordia University

If McCormick's case for her two main theses strikes you as highly plausible, you are not alone: this book very effectively criticizes much of contemporary orthodoxy...Anyone henceforth interested in questions about agency, and its relation to normativity, will need to engage with McCormick's important book. -- Ram Neta, forthcoming in Mind McCormick does an outstanding job drawing our attention to questions about the ultimate basis for epistemic normativity and the extent of our control over belief. -- Peter J. Graham, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews McCormick defends the claims that some beliefs are 'permissible' in the absence of evidence because 'doxastic norms are not wholly evidential.' Further, she suggests that, contrary to 'evidentialism,' criteria for acceptable beliefs must include reference to one's emotions, desires, and well-being - concerns that sometimes override the need for evidence. -- CHOICE Reviews, S.A. Mason, Concordia University

If McCormick's case for her two main theses strikes you as highly plausible, you are not alone: this book very effectively criticizes much of contemporary orthodoxy...Anyone henceforth interested in questions about agency, and its relation to normativity, will need to engage with McCormick's important book. -- Ram Neta, forthcoming in Mind McCormick does an outstanding job drawing our attention to questions about the ultimate basis for epistemic normativity and the extent of our control over belief. -- Peter J. Graham, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews McCormick defends the claims that some beliefs are 'permissible' in the absence of evidence because 'doxastic norms are not wholly evidential.' Further, she suggests that, contrary to 'evidentialism,' criteria for acceptable beliefs must include reference to one's emotions, desires, and well-being - concerns that sometimes override the need for evidence. -- CHOICE Reviews, S.A. Mason, Concordia University

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Miriam Schleifer McCormick is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Richmond, US.

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