Overview

It is impossible to hold patently contradictory beliefs in mind together at once. Why? Because we know that it is impossible for both to be true. This impossibility is a species of rational necessity, a phenomenon that uniquely characterizes the relation between one person's beliefs. Here, Eric Marcus argues that the unity of the rational mind--what makes it one mind--is what explains why, given what we already believe, we can't believe certain things and must believe certain others in this special sense. What explains this is that beliefs, and the inferences by which we acquire them, are constituted by a particular kind of endorsement of those very states and acts. This, in turn, entails that belief and inference are essentially self-conscious: to hold a belief or to make an inference is at the same time to know that one does. An examination of the nature of belief and inference, in light of the phenomenon of rational necessity, reveals how the unity of the rational mind is a function of our knowledge of ourselves as bound to believe the true. Rational self-consciousness is the form of mental togetherness.

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9780192845634

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The idea that there is a kind of mind that is distinctively rational, one whose acts necessarily involve a certain self-awareness and self-intelligibility, has a venerable history in philosophy, but its meaning has never been easy to make clear. As our scientific understanding of human minds has grown, it has become ever more contested. Eric Marcus's book offers an exceptionally lucid, forceful, and up-to-date defense of this idea, one grounded in the thought that rational belief and inference are possible only in virtue of a kind of mental unity that is constituted by self-consciousness. Marcus's theses are bold; his arguments subtle and clear-headed; his engagement with opposing views charitable and rigorous. I expect the book to become a touchstone in discussions about the nature of rational mindedness, an issue that underlies diverse debates in the philosophy of mind and epistemology. * Matthew Boyle, University of Chicago * Some of the most significant moments in the history of philosophy are those moments in which we find ourselves hard-pressed to make sense of something obvious and ordinary. Marcus's book marks such a significant moment: he begins from the ordinary observation that, although our beliefs are often false and inconsistent, it is nonetheless impossible to consciously believe what we know to be false. But what could explain this impossibility? Marcus shows that the only way to explain this observation is to conceive of belief as involving the believer's endorsement of it as true, and more generally to conceive of the various postures of the reasoning mind as each involving endorsement of its own correctness. The result is a compelling defense of self-consciousness as the mark of the reasoning mind. * Ram Neta, University of North Carolina *

The argument of the text is clearly outlined, skillfully crafted, and forcefully written with careful consideration of differing views. * L. C. Archie, CHOICE * The idea that there is a kind of mind that is distinctively rational, one whose acts necessarily involve a certain self-awareness and self-intelligibility, has a venerable history in philosophy, but its meaning has never been easy to make clear. As our scientific understanding of human minds has grown, it has become ever more contested. Eric Marcus's book offers an exceptionally lucid, forceful, and up-to-date defense of this idea, one grounded in the thought that rational belief and inference are possible only in virtue of a kind of mental unity that is constituted by self-consciousness. Marcus's theses are bold; his arguments subtle and clear-headed; his engagement with opposing views charitable and rigorous. I expect the book to become a touchstone in discussions about the nature of rational mindedness, an issue that underlies diverse debates in the philosophy of mind and epistemology. * Matthew Boyle, University of Chicago * Some of the most significant moments in the history of philosophy are those moments in which we find ourselves hard-pressed to make sense of something obvious and ordinary. Marcus's book marks such a significant moment: he begins from the ordinary observation that, although our beliefs are often false and inconsistent, it is nonetheless impossible to consciously believe what we know to be false. But what could explain this impossibility? Marcus shows that the only way to explain this observation is to conceive of belief as involving the believer's endorsement of it as true, and more generally to conceive of the various postures of the reasoning mind as each involving endorsement of its own correctness. The result is a compelling defense of self-consciousness as the mark of the reasoning mind. * Ram Neta, University of North Carolina *

Author Information

Eric Marcus is Professor of Philosophy at Auburn University. He works chiefly in the philosophy of mind and action, but has also published widely in epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, and the philosophy of language. He is the author of Rational Causation (Harvard University Press).

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