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OverviewThe formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in the early 1950s. This book discusses two recent developments in this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly. The second applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets. Rather than surveying the field, the authors present a select number of models, each of which illustrates a key point. In addition, they give detailed proofs throughout the book. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Martin J. Osborne , Ariel RubinsteinPublisher: Emerald Publishing Limited Imprint: Academic Press Inc Dimensions: Width: 15.20cm , Height: 1.70cm , Length: 22.90cm Weight: 0.519kg ISBN: 9780125286329ISBN 10: 0125286325 Pages: 236 Publication Date: 28 April 1990 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print ![]() This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of ContentsIntroduction. Bargaining Theory: The Axiomatic Approach. Nash's Solution. The Strategic Approach. A Model of Alternating Offers. The Relation between the Axiomatic and Strategic Approaches. A Strategic Model of Bargaining between Incompletely Informed Players. Models of Decentralized Trade: First Approach Using the Nash Solution. Strategic Bargaining in a Steady State Market. Strategic Bargaining in a Market with One-Time Entry. The Role of the Trading Procedure. The Role of Anonymity. References. Index.ReviewsThis is a well written book on an important topic. Everyone should run out and buy a copy. --GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR Osborne and Rubenstein's authoritative book represents a landmark in the evolution of bargaining theory. Future research in the field will undoubtedly take the ideas presented in this book as a starting point. Accordingly, it should be read and digested by anyone with a serious interest in formal models of the bargaining process. --CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS Author InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |