Overview

This book is an investigation of Anglo-French military planning in relation to the strengthening of the diplomatic Entente as well as the changed conception of British and French strategic plans and development of forces. Several related factors are also dealt with, including the creation of the British Expeditionary Force and the reconstitution of the British Fleet. According to circumstances, Russian and Belgian planning is correlated with that of France and Britain. The revival of Russian military power is considered as a crucial element, to be taken in conjunction with planned British support to bring about the French decision to undertake a strategic offensive position against Germany. Acquaintance with the political tensions existing before the First World War, particularly the Morocco crisis, as well as the motivation underlying the British-French Entente is assumed.

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Reviews

""Krause examines the military planning between France and the United Kingdom in the years between 1905 and 1914 based on a wide range of sources available to him. Krause excels in this thorough source analysis and in his ability not only to make the sources speak for the historical reconstruction, but also to engage them in conversation with each other and with the reader.... he dares to take exactly the right amount of interpretation and self-positioning."" -- Marc Bergerman, Ph.D., German Pastor, Gettysburg, Pennsylvania ""This book exposes the degree to which conversations between senior military planners in France and Great Britain influenced French war plans. This helps shed additional light on the 'war guilt' controversy that has been an important aspect of our understanding of 20th-century diplomacy. The author provides a full review of the relevant literature that has appeared since he embarked on the study many years ago. This adds a great deal of value to his treatment of the subject. Military histories tend to detail the war plans of a single combatant nation, and diplomatic histories are weak on the treatment of military plans. This study fills the gap."" --Harold Nelson, Ph.D., Brigadier General, U.S. Army (Retired)

Author Information

Colonel Michael Detlef Krause, Ph.D., is a soldier scholar whose career spans combat leadership, strategic planning, and influential historical scholarship. Educated at Norwich University and Georgetown, he entered the U.S. Army with a historian's discipline and a commander's resolve. His early service in Vietnam, advising and leading ARVN units in III Corps, grounded him in the realities of modern conflict and shaped the analytical lens he later brought to the study of war.Krause went on to command multiple battalions, teach at West Point, and serve on the Joint Staff, where he helped develop political-military simulations during a pivotal era of Cold War strategy. As Professor of Strategy and Military History at the National War College, he guided senior officers through the intellectual demands of high-level decision-making. During the Gulf War, he directed the Logistics Planning Cell in Saudi Arabia, contributing to one of the most complex sustainment operations in U.S. military history.After retiring, he led global organizations, advised Congress, founded security and logistics firms, and continued teaching across leading military institutions. His writings on operational art, logistics, and strategy remain foundational contributions to the field.Across five decades, Colonel Krause has shaped how America understands war-its history, its demands, and its future.

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