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OverviewThis is a graduate textbook on the theory of contracting under asymmetric information, a key part of modern microeconomic theory. It examines the characteristics of optimal contracts when one party has certain relevant knowledge that the other party does not. The various problems are presented in the same framework to allow easy comparison of the different results. The authors indicate substantial real-world applications, and exercises for students (with solutions) are provided at the end of each chapter. Full Product DetailsAuthor: Ines Macho-Stadler , J.David Perez-Castrillo , Richard WattPublisher: Oxford University Press Imprint: Oxford University Press Dimensions: Width: 15.00cm , Height: 2.20cm , Length: 23.00cm Weight: 0.643kg ISBN: 9780198774679ISBN 10: 0198774672 Pages: 291 Publication Date: 01 November 1996 Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Language: Spanish Table of ContentsReviews<br> It is a timely contribution to the discipline of Economics as a whole and in particular to Information Economics. --Ian Jackson, Staffordshire University<br> It is a timely contribution to the discipline of Economics as a whole and in particular to Information Economics. --Ian Jackson, Staffordshire University<br> """It is a timely contribution to the discipline of Economics as a whole and in particular to Information Economics.""--Ian Jackson, Staffordshire University" Author InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |
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