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OverviewFull Product DetailsAuthor: Jerzy A. Filar , Vladimir Gaitsgory , Koichi MizukamiPublisher: Birkhauser Boston Inc Imprint: Birkhauser Boston Inc Edition: 2000 ed. Volume: 5 Dimensions: Width: 15.50cm , Height: 2.60cm , Length: 23.50cm Weight: 1.880kg ISBN: 9780817640026ISBN 10: 0817640029 Pages: 461 Publication Date: 30 March 2000 Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: In Print ![]() This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of ContentsI Robust Control Design and H?.- Worst-Case Rate-Based Flow Control with an ARMA Model of the Available Bandwidth.- H? Output Feedback Control Problems for Bilinear Systems.- H? Control of a Class of Infinite-Dimensional Linear Systems with Nonlinear Outputs.- Nonstandard Extension of H?-Optimal Control for Singularly Perturbed Systems.- II Pursuit-Evasion (P-E) Games.- Geodesic Parallel Pursuit Strategy in a Simple Motion Pursuit Game on the Sphere.- Real-Time Collision Avoidance: Differential Game, Numerical Solution, and Synthesis of Strategies.- Rendezvous-Evasion as a Multistage Game with Observed Actions.- Identification and Construction of Singular Surfaces in Pursuit-Evasion Games.- On the Numerical Solution of a Class of Pursuit-Evasion Games.- III Coupled Dynamic and Stochastic Games.- Infinite Horizon Dynamic Games with Coupled State Constraints.- Constrained Markov Games: Nash Equilibria.- Piecewise-Deterministic Differential Games and Dynamic Teams with Hybrid Controls.- A Game Variant of the Stopping Problem on Jump Processes with a Monotone Rule.- IV General Game Theoretic Developments.- Refinement of the Nash Solution for Games with Perfect Information.- A Perturbation on Two-Person Zero-Sum Games.- The Linear Complementarity Problem in Static and Dynamic Games.- Weighted Discounted Stochastic Games with Perfect Information.- Stochastic Games with Complete Information and Average Cost Criteria.- V Applications.- Crime and Law Enforcement: A Multistage Game.- Global Analysis of a Dynamic Duopoly Game with Bounded Rationality.- A Multistage Supergame of Downstream Pollution.- Solution and Stability for a Simple Dynamic Bottleneck Model.- Cumulants and Risk-Sensitive Control: A Cost Mean and Variance Theory with Application to Seismic Protection ofStructures.ReviewsAuthor InformationTab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |