Overview
Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, we should distribute our credences equally over all possibilities we entertain; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how we should plan to respond when we receive new evidence. Ultimately, then, this book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism.To justify these principles, Pettigrew looks to decision theory. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets of credences, and then appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility set out here is the veritist's: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, Pettigrew conducts an investigation in the version of epistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology. The book can also be read as an extended reply on behalf of the veritist to the evidentialist's objection that veritism cannot account for certain evidential principles of credal rationality, such as the Principal Principle, the Principle of Indifference, and Conditionalization.
Full Product Details
Author: Richard Pettigrew (University of Bristol)
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Imprint: Oxford University Press
Dimensions:
Width: 16.80cm
, Height: 2.00cm
, Length: 23.50cm
Weight: 0.508kg
ISBN: 9780198732716
ISBN 10: 0198732716
Pages: 252
Publication Date: 14 April 2016
Audience:
College/higher education
,
Professional and scholarly
,
Tertiary & Higher Education
,
Professional & Vocational
Format: Hardback
Publisher's Status: Active
Availability: To order
Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us.
Reviews
Pettigrew's brilliant book contributes greatly to the systematic development and understanding of Bayesian epistemology and should be read by any serious student of the subject. * Erik J. Olsson, Metascience * For someone who is interested in the relations among these principles, and how they might relate to veritism, this book is essential reading. It does not aim to convince, but instead aims to develop an overall view of a part of epistemology, and show how it fits together. It highlights the weak points, for the purposes of spurring the development of new arguments to shore them up. And it ends with a brief listing of topics for future work. For the general topic of how evidential principles can be derived from a pure concern with truth, Pettigrew's book represents the state of the art. * Kenny Easwaran, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Online *
For someone who is interested in the relations among these principles, and how they might relate to veritism, this book is essential reading. It does not aim to convince, but instead aims to develop an overall view of a part of epistemology, and show how it fits together. It highlights the weak points, for the purposes of spurring the development of new arguments to shore them up. And it ends with a brief listing of topics for future work. For the general topic of how evidential principles can be derived from a pure concern with truth, Pettigrew's book represents the state of the art. Kenny Easwaran, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Online
Pettigrew's brilliant book contributes greatly to the systematic development and understanding of Bayesian epistemology and should be read by any serious student of the subject. Erik J. Olsson, Metascience For someone who is interested in the relations among these principles, and how they might relate to veritism, this book is essential reading. It does not aim to convince, but instead aims to develop an overall view of a part of epistemology, and show how it fits together. It highlights the weak points, for the purposes of spurring the development of new arguments to shore them up. And it ends with a brief listing of topics for future work. For the general topic of how evidential principles can be derived from a pure concern with truth, Pettigrew's book represents the state of the art. Kenny Easwaran, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews Online
Author Information
Richard Pettigrew is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bristol. He completed his PhD in mathematical logic in 2008 under the supervision of John Mayberry. After that, he held a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship until 2011, when he joined the department of philosophy at Bristol. After his PhD, he worked mainly on topics in philosophy of mathematics, with a particular focus on mathematical structuralism. Since 2010, he has also worked in formal epistemology, with a particular interest in deference principles and the role of accuracy in epistemology.
