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Author:   Richard Pettigrew (University of Bristol)
Publisher:   Oxford University Press
Imprint:   Oxford University Press
Dimensions:   Width: 15.50cm , Height: 1.50cm , Length: 23.50cm
Weight:   0.392kg
ISBN:  

9780198822462

ISBN 10:   0198822464
Pages:   252
Publication Date:   30 August 2018
Audience:   College/higher education ,  Professional and scholarly ,  Tertiary & Higher Education ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Paperback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   To order  
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Table of Contents

Introduction I: The accuracy argument for Probabilism 1: From No Drop to Probabilism 2: Formulating the dominance principle 3: Measuring accuracy: existing accounts 4: Measuring accuracy: a new account 5: The Bronfman objection 6: Howson's robustness objection 7: The accuracy argument for Probabilism Appendix I: The mathematical results II: Chance-credence principles 8: The Principal Principle 9: Vindication and chance 10: Dominance and chance 11: Self-undermining chances Appendix II: A summary of chance-credence principles Appendix III: The mathematical results III: The Principle of Indifference 12: Maximin and the Principle of Indifference 13: Hurwicz, regret, and C-maximin Appendix IV: The mathematical results IV: Accuracy and Updating 14: Plan Conditionalization 15: Diachronic Conditionalization Appendix V: The mathematical results 16: Where next for epistemic utility theory? Index

Reviews

For someone who is interested in the relations among these principles, and how they might relate to veritism, this book is essential reading. It does not aim to convince, but instead aims to develop an overall view of a part of epistemology, and show how it fits together. It highlights the weak points, for the purposes of spurring the development of new arguments to shore them up. And it ends with a brief listing of topics for future work. For the general topic of how evidential principles can be derived from a pure concern with truth, Pettigrew's book represents the state of the art. * Kenny Easwaran, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews * Pettigrew's brilliant book contributes greatly to the systematic development and understanding of Bayesian epistemology and should be read by any serious student of the subject. * Erik J. Olsson, Metascience *

Pettigrew's brilliant book contributes greatly to the systematic development and understanding of Bayesian epistemology and should be read by any serious student of the subject. * Erik J. Olsson, Metascience * For someone who is interested in the relations among these principles, and how they might relate to veritism, this book is essential reading. It does not aim to convince, but instead aims to develop an overall view of a part of epistemology, and show how it fits together. It highlights the weak points, for the purposes of spurring the development of new arguments to shore them up. And it ends with a brief listing of topics for future work. For the general topic of how evidential principles can be derived from a pure concern with truth, Pettigrew's book represents the state of the art. * Kenny Easwaran, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *

Author Information

Richard Pettigrew is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bristol. He completed his PhD in mathematical logic in 2008 under the supervision of John Mayberry. After that, he held a British Academy Postdoctoral Fellowship until 2011, when he joined the department of philosophy at Bristol. After his PhD, he worked mainly on topics in philosophy of mathematics, with a particular focus on mathematical structuralism. Since 2010, he has also worked in formal epistemology, with a particular interest in deference principles and the role of accuracy in epistemology.

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