Overview

Law is fast globalizing as a field, and many lawyers, judges and political leaders are engaged in a process of comparative ""borrowing"". But this new form of legal globalization has darksides: it is not just a source of inspiration for those seeking to strengthen and improve democratic institutions and policies. It is increasingly an inspiration - and legitimation device - for those seeking to erode democracy by stealth, under the guise of a form of faux liberal democratic cover. Abusive Constitutional Borrowing: Legal globalization and the subversion of liberal democracy outlines this phenomenon, how it succeeds, and what we can do to prevent it. This book address current patterns of democratic retrenchment and explores its multiple variants and technologies, considering the role of legitimating ideologies that help support different modes of abusive constitutionalism.An important contribution to both legal and political scholarship, this book will of interest to all those working in the legal and political disciplines of public law, constitutional theory, political theory, and political science.

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9780192893765

Table of Contents

Reviews

Dixon and Landau document the extent to which autocratic leaders have figured out how to convert independent courts and written rights guarantees into tools for consolidating power, repressing the opposition, and sidelining minorities. They support this account with a remarkable range of empirical examples, drawn from virtually all regions of the constitutional world. * Thomas M. Keck, Law & Social Inquiry * The richness of the theoretical construction of the argument and the painstaking presentation of examples from different countries constitute the main contributions of this ambitious book. * Jorge González - Jácome, Associate Professor of Law, University of the Andes *

Dixon and Landau document the extent to which autocratic leaders have figured out how to convert independent courts and written rights guarantees into tools for consolidating power, repressing the opposition, and sidelining minorities. They support this account with a remarkable range of empirical examples, drawn from virtually all regions of the constitutional world. * Thomas M. Keck, Law & Social Inquiry *

Author Information

Rosalind Dixon is a Professor of Law at UNSW, Sydney, Australia. She is co-editor, with Tom Ginsburg, of a leading handbook, Comparative Constitutional Law (Edward Elgar, 2011) and related volumes, Comparative Constitutional Law in Asia (Edward Elgar, 2014), and Comparative Constitutional Law in Latin America (Edward Elgar, 2017). Professor Dixon is a Manos Research Fellow, Director of the Gilbert + Tobin Centre of Public Law, Deputy Director of the Herbert Smith Freehills Initiative on Law and Economics, Co-Director of the UNSW New Economic Equality Initiative (NEEI), and academic co-lead of the Grand Challenge on Inequality at UNSW. She was recently elected as co-president of the International Society of Public Law. Professor Landau is a recognized scholar on constitutional theory, constitutional design and comparative constitutional law. His recent work has focused on a range of issues with contemporary salience both in the United States and elsewhere around the world, including constitutional change and constitution-making, judicial role and the enforcement of rights, impeachment, and the erosion of democracy. His scholarship is interdisciplinary, combining insights from law and political science. Professor Landau has published in leading law journals including the University of Chicago Law Review, the Iowa Law Review, the George Washington Law Review, and the Harvard International Law Journal. He has previously published several books and edited volumes with Oxford University Press and Edward Elgar Press.

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