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OverviewA good understanding of the nature of a property requires knowing whether that property is relational or intrinsic. Gabriel Segal's concern is whether certain psychological properties -specifically, those that make up what might be called the ""cognitive content"" of psychological states - are relational or intrinsic. He claims that content supervenes on microstructure, that is, if two beings are identical with respect to their microstructural properties, then they must be identical with respect to their congitive contents. Segal's thesis, a version of internalism, is that being in a state with a specific cognitive content does not essentially involve standing in any real relation to anything external. He uses the fact that content locally supervenes on microstructure to argue for the intrinsicness of content. Cognitive content is fully determined by intrinsic, microstructural properties: duplicate a subject in respect to those properties and you duplicate their congitive contents. The book, written in a clear style, contains four chapters. The first two argue against the two leading externalist theories. Chapter 3 rejects popular theories that endorse two kinds of content: ""narrow"" Full Product DetailsAuthor: Gabriel M.A. SegalPublisher: MIT Press Ltd Imprint: Bradford Books Dimensions: Width: 13.50cm , Height: 1.30cm , Length: 20.10cm Weight: 0.249kg ISBN: 9780262692304ISBN 10: 0262692309 Pages: 189 Publication Date: 02 June 2000 Recommended Age: From 18 Audience: College/higher education , Professional and scholarly , Undergraduate , Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly Format: Paperback Publisher's Status: No Longer Our Product Availability: In Print ![]() This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us. Table of ContentsReviewsPsychological states clearly enter into action, and relate in some way to the mind-external world. They have 'causal' and 'representational' properties, in standard usage (which is far from innocent). How these dual aspects of such states can be understood and reconciled has become a central topic in the study of thought and language. Segal provides a judicious critical analysis of much of the important work that has addressed these issues, also developing original and provocative ideas of his own that offer new perspectives. It is a valuable and most welcome contribution. Noam Chomsky, MIT Psychological states clearly enter into action, and relate in some way to the mind-external world. They have 'causal' and 'representational' properties, in standard usage (which is far from innocent). How these dual aspects of such states can be understood and reconciled has become a central topic in the study of thought and language. Segal provides a judicious critical analysis of much of the important work that has addressed these issues, also developing original and provocative ideas of his own that offer new perspectives. It is a valuable and most welcome contribution. --Noam Chomsky, MIT Author InformationGabriel M.A. Segal is Professor of Philosophy at King's College London. Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |