Long-run Collaboration On Long-run Games, A

Author:   Drew Fudenberg (Harvard Univ, Usa) ,  David K Levine (Washington Univ In St Louis, Usa)
Publisher:   World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd
ISBN:  

9789812818461


Pages:   416
Publication Date:   16 December 2008
Format:   Hardback
Availability:   In Print   Availability explained
This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us.

Our Price $261.36 Quantity:  
Add to Cart

Share |

Long-run Collaboration On Long-run Games, A


Add your own review!

Overview

This book brings together the joint work of Drew Fudenberg and David Levine (through 2008) on the closely connected topics of repeated games and reputation effects, along with related papers on more general issues in game theory and dynamic games. The unified presentation highlights the recurring themes of their work.

Full Product Details

Author:   Drew Fudenberg (Harvard Univ, Usa) ,  David K Levine (Washington Univ In St Louis, Usa)
Publisher:   World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd
Imprint:   World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd
Dimensions:   Width: 16.80cm , Height: 2.50cm , Length: 24.60cm
Weight:   0.839kg
ISBN:  

9789812818461


ISBN 10:   9812818464
Pages:   416
Publication Date:   16 December 2008
Audience:   College/higher education ,  Professional and scholarly ,  Tertiary & Higher Education ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Hardback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   In Print   Availability explained
This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us.

Table of Contents

Limits, Continuity, and Robustness: Limit Games and Limit Equilibria (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); Finite Player Approximations to a Continuum of Players (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements (D Fudenberg et al.); Reputation Effects: Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Single Long-Run Player (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); Maintaining a Reputation Against a Long-Lived Opponent (M Celentani et al.); When is Reputation Bad? (J Ely et al.); Repeated Games: The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (D Fudenberg & E Maskin); Perfect Public Equilibria When Players are Patient (D Fudenberg et al.); Continuous-Time Limits of Discrete-Time Games (D Fudenberg & D K Levine); and other papers.

Reviews

Author Information

Tab Content 6

Author Website:  

Customer Reviews

Recent Reviews

No review item found!

Add your own review!

Countries Available

All regions
Latest Reading Guide

MRG2025CC

 

Shopping Cart
Your cart is empty
Shopping cart
Mailing List