A Game Theory Analysis of Options: Corporate Finance and Financial Intermediation in Continuous Time

Author:   Alexandre C. Ziegler
Publisher:   Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
Edition:   Softcover reprint of hardcover 2nd ed. 2004
ISBN:  

9783642058462


Pages:   176
Publication Date:   07 December 2010
Format:   Paperback
Availability:   In Print   Availability explained
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A Game Theory Analysis of Options: Corporate Finance and Financial Intermediation in Continuous Time


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Overview

This book shows how to combine game theory and option pricing in order to analyze dynamic multiperson decision problems in continuous time and under uncertainty. The basic intuition of the method is to separate the problem of the valuation of payoffs from the analysis of strategic interactions. Whereas the former is to be handled using option pricing, the latter can be addressed by game theory. The text shows how both instruments can be combined and how game theory can be applied to complex problems of corporate finance and financial intermediation. Besides providing theoretical foundations and serving as a guide to stochastic game theory modelling in continuous time, the text contains numerous applications to the theory of corporate finance and financial intermediation, such as the design of debt contracts, capital structure choice, the structure of banking deposit contracts, and the incentive effects of deposit insurance. By combining arbitrage-free valuation techniques with strategic analysis, the game theory analysis of options actually provides the link between markets and organizations.

Full Product Details

Author:   Alexandre C. Ziegler
Publisher:   Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. KG
Imprint:   Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
Edition:   Softcover reprint of hardcover 2nd ed. 2004
Dimensions:   Width: 15.50cm , Height: 1.00cm , Length: 23.50cm
Weight:   0.454kg
ISBN:  

9783642058462


ISBN 10:   3642058469
Pages:   176
Publication Date:   07 December 2010
Audience:   Professional and scholarly ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Paperback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   In Print   Availability explained
This item will be ordered in for you from one of our suppliers. Upon receipt, we will promptly dispatch it out to you. For in store availability, please contact us.

Table of Contents

1 Methodological Issues.- 1.1 Introduction.- 1.2 Game Theory Basics: Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection.- 1.3 Option Pricing Basics: The General Contingent Claim Equation.- 1.4 The Method of Game Theory Analysis of Options.- 1.5 When is the Method Appropriate?.- 1.6 What Kind of Problems is the Method Particularly Suited for?.- 1.7 An Example: Determining the Price of a Perpetual Put Option.- 1.8 Outline of the Book.- 2 Credit and Collateral.- 2.1 Introduction.- 2.2 The Risk-Shifting Problem.- 2.3 The Observability Problem.- 2.4 Conclusion.- 3 Endogenous Bankruptcy and Capital Structure.- 3.1 Introduction.- 3.2 The Model.- 3.3 The Value of the Firm and its Securities.- 3.4 The Effect of Capital Structure on the Firm’s Bankruptcy Decision.- 3.5 The Investment Decision.- 3.6 The Financing Decision.- 3.7 An Incentive Contract.- 3.8 The Impact of Payouts.- 3.9 Conclusion.- 4 Junior Debt.- 4.1 Introduction.- 4.2 The Model.- 4.3 The Value of the Firm and its Securities.- 4.4 The Equity Holders’ Optimal Bankruptcy Choice.- 4.5 The Firm’s Decision to Issue Junior Debt.- 4.6 The Influence of Junior Debt on the Value of Senior Debt.- 4.7 Conclusion.- 5 Bank Runs.- 5.1 Introduction.- 5.2 The Model.- 5.3 The Depositors’ Run Decision.- 5.4 Valuing the Bank’s Equity.- 5.5 The Shareholders’ Recapitalization Decision.- 5.6 The Bank’s Investment Incentives when Bank Runs are Possible.- 5.7 The Bank’s Funding Decision.- 5.8 Determining the Equilibrium Deposit Spread.- 5.9 Conclusion.- 6 Deposit Insurance.- 6.1 Introduction.- 6.2 The Model.- 6.3 Valuing Deposit Insurance, Bank Equity and Social Welfare.- 6.4 The Guarantor’s Liquidation Strategy and Social Welfare.- 6.5 The Incentive Effects of Deposit Insurance.- 6.6 The Impact of Deposit Insurance on theEquilibrium Deposit Spread.- 6.7 Deposit Insurance with Liquidation Delays.- 6.8 Deposit Insurance with Unobservable Asset Value.- 6.9 Conclusion.- 7 Summary and Conclusion.- References.- List of Figures.- List of Symbols.

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