Overview

"This monograph surveys the current literature on game theoretic models of strategic information transmission in politics. Such work generalizes earlier models by allowing relevant information to be asymmetrically held by agents, and subsequently studying the willingness and ability of these agents to transmit information through their actions. Substantively the monograph includes models of agenda control in legislatures and elections, veto threats and debate, electoral competition, reputation building, bargaining in the shadow of war and sophisticated voting. Within each topic the principal focus is on how the presence of asymmetric information enriches the strategic environment of the participants, as well as how it rationalizes certain types of political behaviour and political institutions as equilibrium phenomena in an ""incomplete information"" world."

Full Product Details

Author:   Banks
Publisher:   Harwood-Academic Publishers
Imprint:   Harwood-Academic Publishers
Volume:   Vol. 46
Dimensions:   Width: 13.80cm , Height: 0.60cm , Length: 21.60cm
Weight:   0.158kg
ISBN:  

9783718650873

ISBN 10:   3718650878
Pages:   108
Publication Date:   11 June 1991
Audience:   College/higher education ,  Professional and scholarly ,  Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly ,  Professional & Vocational
Format:   Paperback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   In Print  
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Jeffrey S. Banks, University of Rochester, New York, USA., J. Ferejohn, Stanford University, California.

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