Anatomy of Victory: Why the United States Triumphed in World War II, Fought to a Stalemate in Korea, Lost in Vietnam, and Failed in Iraq

Author:   John D. Caldwell
Publisher:   Rowman & Littlefield
ISBN:  

9781538114773


Pages:   568
Publication Date:   15 January 2019
Format:   Hardback
Availability:   In stock   Availability explained
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Anatomy of Victory: Why the United States Triumphed in World War II, Fought to a Stalemate in Korea, Lost in Vietnam, and Failed in Iraq


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Overview

This groundbreaking book provides the first systematic comparison of America’s modern wars and why they were won or lost. John D. Caldwell uses the World War II victory as the historical benchmark for evaluating the success and failure of later conflicts. Unlike WWII, the Korean, Vietnam, and Iraqi Wars were limited, but they required enormous national commitments, produced no lasting victories, and generated bitter political controversies. Caldwell comprehensively examines these four wars through the lens of a strategic architecture to explain how and why their outcomes were so dramatically different. He defines a strategic architecture as an interlinked set of continually evolving policies, strategies, and operations by which combatant states work toward a desired end. Policy defines the high-level goals a nation seeks to achieve once it initiates a conflict or finds itself drawn into one. Policy makers direct a broad course of action and strive to control the initiative. When they make decisions, they have to respond to unforeseen conditions to guide and determine future decisions. Effective leaders are skilled at organizing constituencies they need to succeed and communicating to them convincingly. Strategy means employing whatever resources are available to achieve policy goals in situations that are dynamic as conflicts change quickly over time. Operations are the actions that occur when politicians, soldiers, and diplomats execute plans. A strategic architecture, Caldwell argues, is thus not a static blueprint but a dynamic vision of how a state can succeed or fail in a conflict.

Full Product Details

Author:   John D. Caldwell
Publisher:   Rowman & Littlefield
Imprint:   Rowman & Littlefield
Dimensions:   Width: 16.20cm , Height: 3.50cm , Length: 23.60cm
Weight:   0.880kg
ISBN:  

9781538114773


ISBN 10:   1538114771
Pages:   568
Publication Date:   15 January 2019
Audience:   General/trade ,  General
Format:   Hardback
Publisher's Status:   Active
Availability:   In stock   Availability explained
We have confirmation that this item is in stock with the supplier. It will be ordered in for you and dispatched immediately.

Table of Contents

Maps, Figures, and Table Preface Acknowledgments PART I: STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURES: INTRODUCTION PART II: WORLD WAR II 1 Battle of Britain: Winning by Not Losing 2 Battle of the Atlantic: Protecting the Maritime Lifeline 3 Invasion of Russia: Hitler’s Strategic Mistake 4 Battle of El Alamein and Operation Torch: Cracking German Invincibility 5 Battles of Midway and Guadalcanal: Regaining Initiative in the Pacific 6 Strategic Bombing Offensive: Breaking German Airpower 7 Invasion of Italy: Deciding to Fight Somewhere in Europe in 1943 8 D-Day and the Battle for Normandy: Retaking the Continent 9 Battle for the Rhine: Attacking Germany’s Vitals 10 Battle of Okinawa and the Bombing of Japan: Ending the War 11 The Strategic Architectures of World War II PART III: THE KOREAN WAR 12 Battle of the Pusan Perimeter: Getting the Most Out of a Bad Situation 13 Inchon—Operation Chromite: MacArthur’s Masterstroke 14 Crossing the 38th Parallel and Driving North to the Yalu: The Risks of Overreaching 15 Operations Ripper and Killer: Recovery and Frustration 16 The Strategic Architectures of the Korean War PART IV: THE VIETNAM WAR 17 Battle of the Ia Drang Valley: Not Fighting the Decisive Battle 18 Bombing Campaign and High-Tech Initiatives: Operations Rolling Thunder and Igloo White Airpower and Technology Indecisive 19 The Pacification Program (1967–1968): Failing to Change Behavior 20 The Tet Offensive (1968): Strategic Disaster 21 Vietnamization: Never a Winning Strategy 22 The Final Years (1969–1975): The Losing Path 23 The Strategic Architectures of the Vietnam War PART V: THE IRAQI WARS 24 Iraqi War I, Persian Gulf War: Defeating Saddam, Losing Politically 25 Iraqi War II, Thirteen-Year Air Conflict: The Limits of Airpower 26 Iraqi War III, Invasion of Iraq: Winning without an Endgame 27 Iraqi War IV, the Insurgency and the Surge (2007–2008): Relearning Counterinsurgency 28 Iraqi War V, the Rise of ISIS: A New, More Violent Enemy 29 The Strategic Architectures of the Iraqi Wars PART VI: STRATEGIC ARCHITECTURES: THE ENDGAME Acronyms and Selected Glossary Notes Selected Bibliography Index

Reviews

Excellent! Fills an important void in our understanding about policy, strategy, and operations.--H. R. McMaster Readers can learn from and enjoy every page of this book, which displays the rare ability to seize immediately upon the essence of military questions. Unfortunately, not many of our generals--and far fewer of our elected leaders--have Caldwell's talent for prescribing the necessities of victory and proscribing the causes of defeat. In masterful summaries that are equal parts history and analysis, he takes us on a truly professional tour of our wars since 1941, allowing us to share his great gift for strategic clarity.--Mark Helprin


Caldwell, a defense analyst, offers up a strategic survey of America's major wars since 1941 to determine why the U.S. was victorious in WWII but has not meet its objectives in the major wars since. . . . [For] those who are interested in but have not read deeply on military strategy, this will be illuminating. * Publishers Weekly * Excellent! Fills an important void in our understanding about policy, strategy, and operations. -- H. R. McMaster Readers can learn from and enjoy every page of this book, which displays the rare ability to seize immediately upon the essence of military questions. Unfortunately, not many of our generals-and far fewer of our elected leaders-have Caldwell's talent for prescribing the necessities of victory and proscribing the causes of defeat. In masterful summaries that are equal parts history and analysis, he takes us on a truly professional tour of our wars since 1941, allowing us to share his great gift for strategic clarity. -- Mark Helprin


Caldwell, a defense analyst, offers up a strategic survey of America's major wars since 1941 to determine why the U.S. was victorious in WWII but has not meet its objectives in the major wars since. . . . [For] those who are interested in but have not read deeply on military strategy, this will be illuminating. * Publishers Weekly * Excellent! Fills an important void in our understanding about policy, strategy, and operations. -- H. R. McMaster Readers can learn from and enjoy every page of this book, which displays the rare ability to seize immediately upon the essence of military questions. Unfortunately, not many of our generals-and far fewer of our elected leaders-have Caldwell's talent for prescribing the necessities of victory and proscribing the causes of defeat. In masterful summaries that are equal parts history and analysis, he takes us on a truly professional tour of our wars since 1941, allowing us to share his great gift for strategic clarity. -- Mark Helprin As interesting a book as it gets. . . . The central problem the author addresses is the unsatisfying outcome to the conflicts after 1945. This is something few of us who witnessed the World War think about. Why has the good Uncle become such a patsy? . . . Caldwell offers a set of guidelines about how to think about involvement in any continuing or future conflict. They make a lot of sense. First and foremost is to align an overseas mission goal with America's core interests and how to achieve that goal. If alignment fails, however, the mission risks failure beyond America's control. * Takimag *


Author Information

John D. Caldwell retired in 2007 after a fifty-year career in defense think tanks and aerospace companies. Trained as a political scientist with a PhD from the University of California, Santa Barbara, he was first posted to Saigon in 1968 as part of a classified research project for the Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency. Caldwell joined TRW Space & Defense in 1982 to work on major defense, NASA, and intelligence community programs. He remains an active consultant at Northrop Grumman Aerospace Systems, which acquired TRW in 2002. He lives in Santa Barbara with his wife, Karen, and their dog Daisy, cat Mr. Bingley, and Martha, a desert tortoise.

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