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OverviewFull Product DetailsAuthor: William ThomsonPublisher: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd Imprint: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd ISBN: 9781848441675ISBN 10: 1848441673 Pages: 784 Publication Date: 29 October 2010 Audience: Professional and scholarly , Professional & Vocational Format: Hardback Publisher's Status: Active Availability: To order ![]() Stock availability from the supplier is unknown. We will order it for you and ship this item to you once it is received by us. Table of ContentsContents: Acknowledgements Introduction William Thomson PART I BASIC PAPERS A Independence 1. John F. Nash Jr. (1950), `The Bargaining Problem' 2. Alvin E. Roth (1977), `Individual Rationality and Nash's Solution to the Bargaining Problem' 3. Alvin E. Roth (1977), `Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem' 4. Hans Peters and Peter Wakker (1991), `Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences' 5. Charles Blackorby, Walter Bossert and David Donaldson (1994), `Generalized Ginis and Cooperative Bargaining Solutions' 6. Efe A. Ok (1998), `Inequality Averse Collective Choice' B Monotonicity 7. Ehud Kalai and Meir Smorodinsky (1975), `Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem' 8. A.E. Roth (1979), `An Impossibility Result Concerning n-Person Bargaining Games' 9. Ehud Kalai (1977), `Proportional Solutions to Bargaining Situations: Interpersonal Utility Comparisons' 10. Haruo Imai (1983), `Individual Monotonicity and Lexicographic Maxmin Solution' 11. W. Thomson and R.B. Myerson (1980), `Monotonicity and Independence Axioms' 12. P.L. Yu (1973), `A Class of Solutions for Group Decision Problems' 13. Youngsub Chun (1988), `The Equal-Loss Principle for Bargaining Problems' C Axioms Pertaining to Operations Performed on Feasible Sets 14. Roger B. Myerson (1977), `Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility' 15. M.A. Perles and M. Maschler (1981), `The Super-Additive Solution for the Nash Bargaining Game' 16. Roger B. Myerson (1981), `Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems' 17. Clara Ponsati and Joel Watson (1997), `Multiple-Issue Bargaining and Axiomatic Solutions' 18. Hans Peters (1986), `Simultaneity of Issues and Additivity in Bargaining' D Ordinal Invariance 19. Lloyd S. Shapley (1969), `Utility Comparison and the Theory of Games' 20. Lars Tyge Nielsen (1983), `Ordinal Interpersonal Comparisons in Bargaining' 21. Yves Sprumont (2000), `A Note on Ordinally Equivalent Pareto Surfaces' 22. Zvi Safra and Dov Samet (2004), `An Ordinal Solution to Bargaining Problems with Many Players' E Non-convex Problems 23. John P. Conley and Simon Wilkie (1991), `The Bargaining Problem Without Convexity: Extending the Egalitarian and Kalai-Smorodinksy Solutions' 24. Lin Zhou (1997), `The Nash Bargaining Theory with Non-Convex Problems' PART II UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF THE DISAGREEMENT POINT A Monotonocity 25. William Thomson (1987), `Monotonicity of Bargaining Solutions with Respect to the Disagreement Point' B Axioms Pertaining to Operations Performed on Disagreement Points 26. Hans Peters and Eric van Damme (1991), `Characterizing the Nash and Raiffa Bargaining Solutions by Disagreement Point Axioms' 27. Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1990), `Bargaining with Uncertain Disagreement Points' PART III VARIABLE POPULATION OF AGENTS A Population Monotonicity 28. William Thomson (1983), `The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population' 29. William Thomson (1983), `Problems of Fair Division and the Egalitarian Solution' 30. William Thomson and Terje Lensberg (1983), `Guarantee Structures for Problems of Fair Division' B Consistency and Its Converse 31. Terje Lensberg (1987), `Stability and Collective Rationality' 32. Terje Lensberg (1988), `Stability and the Nash Solution' 33. Youngsub Chun (2002), `The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining' PART IV ENRICHING THE MODEL A Adding Information About Underlying Set of Physical Alternatives 34. Richard E. Kihlstrom, Alvin E. Roth and David Schmeidler (1981), `Risk Aversion and Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem' 35. Alvin E. Roth and Uriel G. Rothblum (1982), `Risk Aversion and Nash's Solution for Bargaining Games with Risky Outcomes' 36. Zvi Safra, Lin Zhou and Itzhak Zilcha (1990), `Risk Aversion in the Nash Bargaining Problem with Risky Outcomes and Risky Disagreement Points' 37. John E. Roemer (1988), `Axiomatic Bargaining Theory on Economic Environments' 38. Ariel Rubinstein, Zvi Safra and William Thomson (1992), `On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and its Extension to Non-Expected Utility Preferences' 39. Zvi Safra and Itzhak Zilcha (1993), `Bargaining Solutions without the Expected Utility Hypothesis' 40. Simon Grant and Atsushi Kajii (1995), `A Cardinal Characterization of the Rubinstein-Safra-Thomson Axiomatic Bargaining Theory' B Adding Claims 41. Youngsub Chun and William Thomson (1992), `Bargaining Problems with Claims' 42. Walter Bossert (1993), `An Alternative Solution to Bargaining Problems with Claims' C Adding Preferences Over Solutions 43. Kim C. Border and Uzi Segal (1997), `Preferences Over Solutions to the Bargaining Problem' PART V STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS A Analyzing Bargaining Problems as Strategic Games 44. John Nash (1953), `Two-Person Cooperative Games' 45. Eric van Damme (1986), `The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal' 46. Ariel Rubinstein (1982), `Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model' B Manipulation 47. Vincent P. Crawford and Hal R. Varian (1979), `Distortion of Preferences and The Nash Theory of Bargaining' 48. Joel Sobel (1981), `Distortion of Utilities and the Bargaining Problem' C Implementation 49. H. Moulin (1984), `Implementing the Kalai-Smorodinsky Bargaining Solution' 50. Eiichi Miyagawa (2002), `Subgame-Perfect Implementation of Bargaining Solutions' PART VI EXPERIMENTS 51. M.E. Yaari and M. Bar-Hillel (1984), `On Dividing Justly'ReviewsAuthor InformationEdited by William Thomson, Elmer B. Milliman Professor of Economics, University of Rochester, US Tab Content 6Author Website:Countries AvailableAll regions |